Come and get it! A generous helping of Weekly Review!
Two cases above the fold. Habeas grant that has been previously noted around here. And an interesting Miranda issue, but no COA. It is the lack of a COA that I am going to discuss.
And I do want to mention that there are a couple of below-the-fold cases with detailed notations.
On to the cases:
1. Petronio v. Walsh, 09-CV-341, 2010 WL 3564269 (EDNY Sept. 14, 2010) (ADS)
- Habeas Granted
- Issues: whether there was legally insufficient evidence to support petitioner's conviction for depraved indifference murder
- Notes: To be published
ANALYSIS: Prior post here. As noted in my prior post, there are some very interesing procedural issues raised in this case. It probably should be heard with at least one other case currently pending before the Second Circuit that raises similar issues.
2. Morgan v. Rock, 08-CV-0650, 2010 WL 3703697 (WDNY Sept. 16, 2010) (MAT)
- Habeas Denied
- Issues: (1) improper admission of evidence; (2) insufficient
evidence; (3) improperly precluded
from questioning prospective jurors; (4) Miranda and right to counsel violation; (5) IAC; (6) excessive sentence
ANALYSIS: Interesting Miranda issue. The allegations were that petitioner murdered his girlfriend, who had previously gone missing.
An officer responded to a fight outside petitioner's home. The officer learned that there was an outstanding warrant for petitioner and took him into custody. While petitioner was handcuffed in the back of a car, the officer questioned petitioner. First, he asked whether he had identification. He didn't, so the police officer asked to escort him inside to get ID. Petitioner said that he was not going to take him inside the home. The officer then asked petitioner when was the last time he had seen the victim, and he said that he had seen her the prior week when she had a doctor's appointment. The officer asked to go into the house, and petitioner said no and he would not give permission for it. The officer then asked for the doctor's name, and petitioner said he wouldn't answer any more questions.
The Supreme Court in a case called Quarles has stated that there is an "emergency exception" to Miranda when questions are necessary to secure the officer's safety or that of the public. Actually, it's kind of similar to the Davis v. Washington test back before the Supreme Court.
The New York Court of Appeals broadly interpreted Quarles in a case called Krom from 1984. It said that, so long as a victim is missing, officers can question a suspect, even if he asserts his Miranda rights. Did I say broad? I should have said read Miranda right out of existence.
The state court upheld the questioning under Krom.
Here, the DJ assumes, without deciding, that Krom is an unreasonable application of Quarles. But decides that the error was harmless. No COA.
This particular DJ is very stingy with COA's. He usually issues 3 to 4 habeas opinions a week, and over the last year and change, he has only granted one COA -- and that was when an MJ recommended it. Notably, according to my Pending Second Circuit Cases page, the Second Circuit has granted COA's in three of his cases this year. That's more than any other DJ. So it would not be unreasonable to say that this DJ should be granting more COA's than he is currently doing.*
*I won't even begin to say how much it bugs me that this DJ also certifies -- in every single one of his habeas denials -- that an appeal would not be brought in good faith. That is a complete misuse of that statute. Particularly when the petition is counseled. He is basically accusing the lawyer of misconduct. But this is a more involved post/complaint for another day.
Now, I am not saying that this is a great candidate for a COA. But it's a pretty good one. The DJ suggests that a long-standing New York Court of Appeals decision may be an unreasonable application of a Supreme Court decision. That's COA-worthy. And I have previously stated that if a court shifts to a harmless error analysis after finding a constitutional violation, that's another potential area for a COA.
And in looking at the court's harmless error analysis, I am not fully convinced. The DJ says that the statement was not completely inculpatory, was similar to what he had said to the victim's family members, and the evidence of guilt was "compelling."
These grounds are supported by the record, but they don't give the reader complete confidence that the error was 100% harmless (or let's say 95% harmless). I think the statement was inculpatory enough. And statements to a police officer -- admitted as official admissions -- are qualitatively different than similar statements made to civilians. And while compelling is a strong word, it is not the strongest that can be used when looking at the strength of the evidence. Here is the evidence that the court cites (WARNING, it's grisly):
Petitioner,
who had allegedly been subject to physical abuse at the hands of his
former girlfriend, admitted to dismembering the victim's body after her
death. He actively concealed her death at the house that he shared with
her, and attempted to dispose of her body parts by cooking them,
freezing them, and flushing them down the toilet. While petitioner was
incarcerated, he admitted that he killed the victim.
Strong, but mostly circumstantial. And I think it is always questionable to rely on jailhouse confessions. I think that it could be reasonably argued that even this not-completely-inculpatory statement could have had a real effect here.
It's not a bad candidate for a COA. Do I think the Second Circuit will grant one? No. But that's because they don't grant many. The DJ's grant the higher percentage of COA's and are tasked to do it in every case (sometimes the Second Circuit never gets to answer that question). So I think it is more appropriate to question when a DJ does not grant one.
Remaining cases below the fold . . .