Habeas Corpus Blog

Habeas Corpus - Interesting Habeas from 1st Circuit

Here's an interesting article about a habeas case that was recently argued before the First Circuit.

The issue in the murder case is whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the defense that petitioner "killed two business associates because his ingestion of Zoloft caused a drug-induced state of agitation called akathisia."

But it does appear from the article that petitioner's counsel had a pretty difficult go of it at oral argument.  I don't expect this case to come out in petitioner's favor.

Interesting nonetheless.

Habeas Corpus - Interesting Article in the Times

The New York Times today has an article about a death row inmate who, in exchange for pleading guilty to first-degree murder, was banished from Oklahoma.

Although the words "habeas corpus" are never mentioned, they play an important part of the story as the defendant was granted habeas relief from the 10th Circuit based on IAC at trial.  That decision began the progression towards the guilty plea, which included an intervening second trial and conviction -- which was also overturned on IAC grounds, that one by a state court.

What's interesting about the article is that it is kind of fashioned as an actual innocence-type story, but it never really makes the case that this is an actual innocence case.  The plea agreement suggests that there are strong questions about his guilt.  And the main witness appears to have been completely unreliable.  But it never really talks much about those things. 

Rather, the article is more about the unusual guilty plea and how difficult and confusing re-entry into society can be after a long incarceration.  Worth checking out.

Habeas Corpus - Other Circuits

Been spending some time this week on the other circuit's websites.  I am going to share my opinions about how the different websites compare to the Second Circuit's.  But I'll save that for when I have more time.

Today, I just wanted to mention that, following a recent decision from the Second Circuit, the First Circuit held yesterday in Riva v. Ficco, that the one-year statute of limitations can be equitably tolled due to petitioner's mental illness.

Actually, the Second Circuit had been the most recent court to hold this.  Every other circuit to have addressed it came to the same conclusion.  Now we can add the First Circuit to that list.

Habeas Corpus - Other Circuits - Supreme Court Remand

A small habeas development over in the Eleventh Circuit. 

This past term in the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Holland v. Florida, finding that the gross negligence of an attorney can equitably toll the statute of limitations.  See my (brief) discussion of the case here.

At the end of the opinion, the Court left "it to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the facts in this record entitle Holland to equitable tolling, or whether further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, might indicate that respondent should prevail." 

Today, the Eleventh Circuit decided to ship it down to the district court for "fact finding and further proceedings -- including, if it is necessary, an evidentiary hearing -- consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions."  The remand order is here.

Is this a good sign for petitioner?  Not sure.  The Eleventh Circuit could have acted on its own and found equitable tolling.  It did not.  It decided that more fact finding was necessary.  Evidentiary hearings are usually a positive development for petitioners.  But the Supreme Court's remand sentence is a little weird -- hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether "respondent should prevail"?  The evidentiary hearing is usually held to determine whether the moving party should prevail.  So it's a little backwards.

Maybe the Eleventh Circuit picked up on the backwardness of that remand discussion and decided that an evidentiary hearing may actually harm petitioner as it could establish facts unfavorable to the equitable tolling.  Okay, that's a pretty cynical way of looking at it.  But the Eleventh Circuit has, in the past, ruled against petitioner.  So the court doesn't really seem inclined to act in his favor.  And the court did note in the remand order that the district court should act consistent with the Supreme Court instructions --  which was to see whether respondent should prevail.

I'd be curious to see how this case eventually gets resolved.

Habeas Corpus - Other Circuits - A Complaint About the AEDPA

Taking a look around the other circuits today, I came across a really interesting habeas opinion out of the Sixth Circuit.  Actually, the opinion itself wasn't too interesting; it was the concurring opinion that got my attention. 

The name of the case is Pinchon v. Myers; it's available here.  Petitioner, who was 17-years-old at the time of the murder, was sentenced to life in  prison. The main issue in the case is whether petitioner's motion to amend his petition to add an IAC claim was within the one-year statute of limitation.  The court concludes that it was not. 

Although the concurring judge was constrained to agree with the outcome, the judge wrote separately to "express my distress over the harsh edges of AEDPA and our habeas jurisprudence, displayed so dramatically in this case."

After discussing the evidence that showed that petitioner was "mildly mentally retarded," the judge reviewed petitioner's post-judgment actions and found that he had acted diligently overall.  Nevertheless, despite that diligence, the petition was out-of-time.

The judge believed that the harsh outcome in the case was unfair and did not further the goals of comity or finality.  In his final paragraph, the judge unleashes a great rant against the unfairness of the result.  Here's what he says:

It is disheartening and frustrating to acknowledge that the ability to pursue one’s constitutional rights—with a life prison sentence hanging in the balance—can turn on such minor distinctions and such a small, understandable mistake made by an incarcerated, mentally retarded, young man with no attorney. Indeed, although these doctrines are grounded in the valid policy interests of efficiency and finality, this decision does not satisfy these interests. Rather than avoiding repetitive, time-consuming litigation, the application of these doctrines has resulted in years of litigation on procedural issues rather than the substance of Pinchon’s claims. I believe that Pinchon’s petition unjustly has been lost in the “Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments” present in our habeas system. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). I concur in the judgment only because my misgivings about the outcome of this case “do[] not . . . justify a refusal to respect precedents that remain a part of our law.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

Habeas Corpus - De Novo vs. Deference Revisited

In a previous post (using the prior Font), I discussed de novo review of constitutional claims on habeas corpus vs. deferring to the state court decision under the 2254(d) standard of review (see FAQ 3) created in the AEDPA (see FAQ 2).  The question in the prior post was whether a state court's silence on a constitutional claim would allow the federal court to review the claim de novo (a favorable outcome to petitioners) or would the analysis of the claim still require application of the deferential 2254(d) standard of review (unfavorable to petitioners). 

At the end of the prior post, I suggested that it would make a difference in some cases.  I stated:

In the end, I would love to say that the different types of review do not matter.  But I fear that they do.  As mentioned before, 2254(d) is oppressive.  While there have been plenty of cases where habeas has been granted under 2254(d), I would guess that plenty more potentially meritorious claims have fallen victim to the required deference.

Today, the Ninth Circuit gives a real good example of a situation where de novo vs. deferential standard of review would make a difference.

In Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether a certain type of factual finding falls under the "prior conviction" exception to the Apprendi rule, which states that any fact, except for the fact of a prior conviction, used to enhance a punishment beyond the otherwise applicable maximum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The state court found that the factual finding at issue in that case -- the fact that the defendant committed a crime while on parole -- fell within the prior conviction exception to the Apprendi rule.

In a prior decision called Butler, the Ninth Circuit squarely held that this type of factual finding did not fall under the prior conviction exception. 

The court in Kessee noted that, if it was allowed to review the claim directly on direct appeal, it would simply apply its prior precedent in Butler and find the sentence unconstitutional.

However, Kessee was a habeas case.  This meant that the court was required to apply the deferential standard of review (n.b. the state court addressed the merits of the claim).  Under the standard of review, the court was required to determine whether the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of federal law.  According to the Ninth Circuit, just because the state court came to a different result than it had in its decision in Butler did not mean that the state court acted unreasonably.

Instead, the court looked to see how other courts around the country had decided the issue and, if other courts had agreed with the state court's conclusion, then it cannot be stated that the state court's decision was unreasonable.  Other courts had, so habeas corpus was denied.

As can be seen, this decision really shows the emasculating effect of the AEDPA standard of review.  The Ninth Circuit had previously reached a reasoned conclusion on this very issue.  However, the standard of review does not allow the court to apply it directly on habeas.  Rather, the standard of review requires it to set its own judgment aside and give full equality to a position that the court has already rejected, simply because, as the Ninth Circuit sees it, other courts have adopted it.

I guess a deeper question is whether the Ninth Circuit needed to be this deferential.  This really is taking deference to the extreme here.  Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the only way something would be unreasonable would be if no court had ever decided it in the same manner as the state court.  Otherwise, so long as one other court had agreed with the state court, then it could not be unreasonable.

Fortunately, the Supreme Court rejected that extreme approach in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  They rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach that a state-court decision involves an “unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law” only if the state court has applied federal law “in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable.”  That comes dangerously close to what the Ninth Circuit was suggesting in Kessee.

I guess the saving grace for the Ninth Circuit in Kessee is that several other courts had disagreed with Butler.  I personally agree with Butler and disagree with those other decisions.  But where there are several courts that have come out the same way as the state court, it certainly is an important factor to consider as to whether the state court decision is reasonable.  While the AEDPA forces the habeas court to be deferential, it does not completely strip them of independent judgment as to whether something is unreasonable.  I would think that if the Ninth Circuit is absolutely, 100% certain that its decision in Butler was correct, then this would also provide a reasonable ground for the court to conclude that the state court's decision was unreasonable.