Habeas Corpus Blog

Habeas Corpus - Argument Day - Beard v. Kindler

This morning afternoon (it was heard at 1:00 p.m), the Supreme Court will hear argument in the capital habeas case of Beard v. Kindler.

According to ScotusWiki, the issue in the case is: "Is a state procedural rule automatically “inadequate” under the adequate-state-grounds doctrine - and therefore unenforceable on federal habeas corpus review - because the state rule is discretionary rather than mandatory?"

Quick facts:  While his case was pending in the trial court, the defendant broke out of prison and fled.  In absentia, he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.  Before he was returned to custody, the trial court exercised its discretion and dismissed post-verdict motions against the defendant because he was a fugitive.  That prevented the defendant from raising those issues on appeal.

The Third Circuit held that this discretionary dismissal did not represent an independent and adequate state law ground barring habeas review.

I am highly skeptical that the Supreme Court will agree with that position.  But if it does, I believe that there would be an impact in New York.  I can think of a few discretionary procedural rules.

First, similar to the one at issue in Beard, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in New York is discretionary for those fugitives who are returned to custody while their appeals are still pending.  See People v. Taveras, 10 N.Y.3d 227 (2008). 

Second, some of the dismissal provisions under 440 for post-convictions motions to vacate a conviction are also discretionary.  See C.P.L. 440.10(3) ("the court may deny a motion  . . .").  I will say that this provision is an odd discretionary provision, as the court seems to only have the authority to address the claim if it believes the claim is meritorious.  Nevertheless, it is discretionary.  The same can be said about a dismissal under all of the provisions of C.P.L. 440.30(4).  Note from case 4 of the most recent Weekly Review that some federal courts in New York have found that a dismissal under 440.30(4)(a) is not a bar to habeas review because it requires the state court to review the merits of the motion.

I am guessing that there are others.  So, on the odd chance that the Supreme Court will agree with the 3rd Circuit, this case could be a highly favorable opinion for habeas petitioners in New York State. 

It is interesting to note that a whole bunch of States submitted an amicus brief obviously arguing that the 3rd Circuit should be reversed.  New York did not participate.

I am very curious to read what happens at oral argument today.  I'll post my thoughts after I read the transcript.

UPDATE: The SCOTUSblog preview can be found here.

Habeas Corpus - Cone v. Bell - Hidden Gems

I have finally gotten around to posting an in-depth analysis of Cone v. Bell, a Supreme Court habeas decision from April.  My initial take on the decision back when it was issued was that the unusual factual scenario in the case rendered it of little value.

However, after reading it closely, I realized that it actually had some hidden gems with huge importance to habeas petitioners.  I am actually surprised that these hidden gems didn’t get more attention.

On its surface, the case is about the procedural bar known as the “independent and adequate state law ground” (“IASLG”).  An IASLG means that, if the state refused to reach the merits of a federal claim based on a state procedural ground, then this procedural ground will bar habeas review so long as it is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.  If the procedural ground is independent and adequate, the petitioner would have to show cause and prejudice for the procedural default, or that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, in order to have the claim reviewed in a habeas proceeding.

The decision in Cone v. Bell focused on what makes a procedural rule “adequate” to support the judgment.  Courts have articulated several different ways in which a procedural ground may not be adequate: was it firmly established, had it been consistently or regularly and strictly applied, does it rest on a fair or substantial basis.

An interesting question in this context is whether a misapplication of a state procedural rule represents an inadequate state law ground?

The petitioner in Cone had asked the Court to address this question.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue.  But the Court’s analysis does strongly suggest that a federal court should indeed look to see how the state court has applied a procedural rule in determining whether it is adequate.

But to my surprise, the case went beyond this issue and I found at least two hidden gems that are really helpful to habeas petitioners.

So, follow me below the fold as I discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Cone v. Bell . . .

Habeas Corpus - Cone v. Bell

Cone v. Bell, __ U.S. __, 2009 WL 1118709 (April 28, 2009)

Good decision today out of the Supreme Court for habeas petitioners!  It’s available here.

In Cone v. Bell, the Supreme Court concluded that a state court’s decision that an issue was “procedurally defaulted” (see FAQ 5) did not prevent the federal court’s from reviewing the claim since the state procedural bars did not represent independent and adequate state law grounds.

At a later date, I’ll provide a more in depth analysis of this case, including what it means for a procedural bar to represent an independent and adequate state law ground.  But that’ll have to wait to when I have had a chance to sit down and read through it.

One thing that can be noted right away is that this was a far more traditional break down of liberal vs. conservative judges.  The decision was written by Stevens and he was joined by who you would expect: Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and Kennedy.  Roberts concurred in the judgment.  Alito concurred in part and dissented in part.  And Scalia and Thomas dissented.  It’s nearly a perfect representation of the Court’s current ideological spectrum (except for Alito's partial concurrence; in my mind, he is kind of in between Scalia and Thomas on the spectrum).  Kind of interesting.