Gueits v. Kirkpatrick, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2009 WL 1491077 (EDNY May 27, 2009) (BMC) (JO)
"Gueits may well have committed or been complicit in the assault with which he was charged; at best, he was by his own account unwilling to help the Victim of that assault when she was in desperate need of his aid. Whatever the truth, it is clear that he was convicted of the crime and is now imprisoned as the result of the denial of his constitutional right to counsel. The prosecution in this case was marred by a cynical approach that produced an unreliable conviction and that ignored strong evidence that another man may have committed both the assault for which Gueits is now in prison as well as the rape that has gone unpunished. The result is not only unfair to Gueits, but also to the victim whose rapist apparently remains at large and to the public. The [State's] indifference to this obvious injustice is nothing short of astonishing." -- Magistrate Judge Orenstein
You may be asking yourself at this point, how did this case get to the point where a federal judge had to make such a provocative statement?
This really is an unusual and compelling case. I'll go into more details about the really unique facts of this case below the fold.
"Gueits may well have committed or been complicit in the assault with which he was charged; at best, he was by his own account unwilling to help the Victim of that assault when she was in desperate need of his aid. Whatever the truth, it is clear that he was convicted of the crime and is now imprisoned as the result of the denial of his constitutional right to counsel. The prosecution in this case was marred by a cynical approach that produced an unreliable conviction and that ignored strong evidence that another man may have committed both the assault for which Gueits is now in prison as well as the rape that has gone unpunished. The result is not only unfair to Gueits, but also to the victim whose rapist apparently remains at large and to the public. The [State's] indifference to this obvious injustice is nothing short of astonishing." -- Magistrate Judge Orenstein
You may be asking yourself at this point, how did this case get to the point where a federal judge had to make such a provocative statement?
This really is an unusual and compelling case. I'll go into more details about the really unique facts of this case below the fold.
The victim was raped and severely beaten. She told medical personnel that a single man had raped and assaulted her.
Later that morning, the police found Gueits, who is Hispanic, in the park. Gueits had the victim's blood on his sneaker. The police also showed Gueits to the victim and asked her if she knew him. The victim, who was drifting in and out of consciousness with her eyes swollen shut, responded by "shaking" her head up and down.
Gueits told the police that he did not commit the crime. He said that he had been out drinking with another man at a sports bar and saw the woman at the bar. He was sitting in the park when he saw an African-American man enter the park with the woman. The man attacked the woman, and when she came to him for help, he pushed her away, which is how he got blood on her shoe.
Gueits was charged with rape and assault. However, DNA tests on the semen unequivocally showed that Gueits was not the rapist. Instead, the DNA evidence matched the DNA profile of a man, who had committed a rape in Maryland and been described by the victim in that case as an African-American man.
This discovery forced the prosecution to abandon the rape charges against Gueits. However, it refused to drop the entire case against Gueits. Instead, the prosecution pushed forward with the assault charge on the theory that two people had been involved in the assault and that the rape was basically irrelevant to the case. This was done even though the victim had told people that she only been assaulted by one person.
At trial, the victim, who was deeply intoxicated on the night of the incident, gave conflicting testimony about how many people had assaulted her. At first she said that it could have been three. When told she couldn't speculate, she said it was three. But when the court told her that she could say that she didn't remember if she did not remember, she said that she did not remember. According to the Magistrate Judge, on cross examination, defense counsel did not poke holes in the prosecution's case, but did the opposite -- he filled in gaps in the story that suggested that the victim had not been assaulted by an African-American male.
In her testimony, the victim also did not identify Gueits in court as the person she had previously identified. The court later allowed the police officer who was present for the prior "identification" testify that the victim had identified Gueits, even though this type of evidence is inadmissible through the officer. The Magistrate Judge concluded that, based on what happened at trial, the admission of this evidence was improper. At trial, defense counsel did not articulate the proper reasons why this evidence should not have been admitted.
A different witness testified at trial that she saw a woman sitting in the park that night with two other men. She later saw one man, whose race she could not determine, attacking her. She called 911 and told them that she saw someone beating up the woman. When she returned to her window, she no longer saw the assailant. During this witness's testimony, the prosecutor was able to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence -- Grand Jury testimony from this witness -- that was unfavorable to Gueits. According to the Magistrate Judge, this was improper and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to prevent this from occurring.
The defense did not introduce the exonerating DNA evidence. In fact, defense counsel did not even take the necessary steps to preserve the evidence. Defense counsel sought an agreement that the evidence could be presented to the jury, but the prosecution did not agree. According to the Magistrate Judge, defense counsel failed to explain to the court how this agreement was relevant to the case.
During the prosecutor's closing statement, the prosecutor made several improper remarks that misused evidence and misled the jury about the DNA evidence and the dropped rape charge. Defense counsel did not object to any of it. He also did not object to an improper jury charge.
After losing in state court, Gueits brought the winning habeas petition. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Gueits had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The judge made clear that the question for the court was not whether or not Gueits was guilty or innocent, but whether he had been deprived of his right to counsel, which he had. The judge added, though, that the question of guilt of innocence "is a matter that should nevertheless be of paramount importance to the State of New York."
One other thing to note in the Magistrate Judge's report is that, during the habeas proceedings, the State put forward a new theory of the case -- that the victim was never actually raped, and that the sex had been consensual, even though the victim repeatedly stated that she had been raped and the prosecutor at the trial had asked her about "the man who had raped her." I guess it is this dissonant shift in theories that would lead a Magistrate Judge to conclude that the prosecution was a bit "cynical."
The district court judge has now adopted the report and recommendation, which means that there now officially has been a habeas grant. Because habeas relief was granted, the State have a right to appeal the case to the Second Circuit. I am sure they will.
What to make of this case? The facts are highly unusual, so it is difficult to make broad sweeping judgments. But, for me, there are a couple of interesting things worth discussing.
First, it is interesting that not all of the errors that counsel made were of the slap your hand on your forehead and shout out, "What was he thinking?" variety. Some were, but others were a little more subtle. However, it really doesn't, or shouldn't, matter that some mistakes were subtle. The errors here, including the most subtle ones, caused a great deal of prejudice to Gueits. The only evidence that directly linked Gueits to the crime was evidence that should not have been admitted. And the evidence that was admitted to establish that fact was equivocal. And the prosecutor improperly made use of that equivocal evidence to establish a stronger link than really existed. It really is a case where there was a breakdown in the process.
At the same time, anybody reading this decision will be compelled to ask, just what in the world did happen here? The story that Gueits gave to the police seems unbelievable, he was in the park and did have her blood on his shoe. At the same time, DNA evidence exonerated him of the rape and the victim did say that the same person who raped her was the one who assaulted her. So, the evidence was contradictory making it really hard to sort out in one's mind a logical version of what actually could have happened.
The other big point here is the prosecution's conduct. The Magistrate Judge described it as "cynical." That is actually pretty generous in my mind. I am usually pretty open-minded to the belief that the prosecution doesn't act maliciously. At least, without an animus towards the particular defendant. Lawyers are competitive people, often times, with big egos. Prosecutors are lawyers. It's a basic syllogism. Also, it is difficult for most people to step outside of the situation that they are in, look at things from a different perspective, and reassess their position.
In a criminal case, these cascading forces can cause great ripple effects. A prosecutor becomes convinced that a defendant has committed the crime, regardless even of a change in circumstances. Rather than change opinions, prosecutors (like most people) will bunker down and fight even harder to show that their position is correct. The prosecutor, as a lawyer with likely a big ego, will approach the trial as a must-win proposition, not as a way for justice to be served. This happens in many of the wrongful conviction cases. Lawyers want to win and do what they can to ensure it. The prosecutor broke many evidentiary and trial rules to accomplish that here. It is usually not done with malice, just with a blind desire to win.
But unfortunately, the State's actions here cannot be written off as mere human failing. The State's cynicism and basic meanness really can be seen in the statements they made in the habeas proceeding. To say that this was not a rape, even though the victim repeatedly stated that and that was clearly their position at trial, is just shocking. It is also insulting to the victim, whose interest they no longer seem to be considering. That type of statement indicates that the State has lost its way in this case.
This is not to say that they won't be successful before the Second Circuit. We are still talking about habeasland, where habeas relief is granted less than 1% of the time. However, the injustice here was apparent, at least as set out in the Report and Recommendation, and it would truly serve the criminal justice system for Gueints to receive a fair trial with competent counsel where the jury is only allowed to consider admissible evidence, permissible arguments, and the exonerating DNA evidence. Only under those circumstances can anybody have faith that the verdict is reliable.
Gueits told the police that he did not commit the crime. He said that he had been out drinking with another man at a sports bar and saw the woman at the bar. He was sitting in the park when he saw an African-American man enter the park with the woman. The man attacked the woman, and when she came to him for help, he pushed her away, which is how he got blood on her shoe.
Gueits was charged with rape and assault. However, DNA tests on the semen unequivocally showed that Gueits was not the rapist. Instead, the DNA evidence matched the DNA profile of a man, who had committed a rape in Maryland and been described by the victim in that case as an African-American man.
This discovery forced the prosecution to abandon the rape charges against Gueits. However, it refused to drop the entire case against Gueits. Instead, the prosecution pushed forward with the assault charge on the theory that two people had been involved in the assault and that the rape was basically irrelevant to the case. This was done even though the victim had told people that she only been assaulted by one person.
At trial, the victim, who was deeply intoxicated on the night of the incident, gave conflicting testimony about how many people had assaulted her. At first she said that it could have been three. When told she couldn't speculate, she said it was three. But when the court told her that she could say that she didn't remember if she did not remember, she said that she did not remember. According to the Magistrate Judge, on cross examination, defense counsel did not poke holes in the prosecution's case, but did the opposite -- he filled in gaps in the story that suggested that the victim had not been assaulted by an African-American male.
In her testimony, the victim also did not identify Gueits in court as the person she had previously identified. The court later allowed the police officer who was present for the prior "identification" testify that the victim had identified Gueits, even though this type of evidence is inadmissible through the officer. The Magistrate Judge concluded that, based on what happened at trial, the admission of this evidence was improper. At trial, defense counsel did not articulate the proper reasons why this evidence should not have been admitted.
A different witness testified at trial that she saw a woman sitting in the park that night with two other men. She later saw one man, whose race she could not determine, attacking her. She called 911 and told them that she saw someone beating up the woman. When she returned to her window, she no longer saw the assailant. During this witness's testimony, the prosecutor was able to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence -- Grand Jury testimony from this witness -- that was unfavorable to Gueits. According to the Magistrate Judge, this was improper and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to prevent this from occurring.
The defense did not introduce the exonerating DNA evidence. In fact, defense counsel did not even take the necessary steps to preserve the evidence. Defense counsel sought an agreement that the evidence could be presented to the jury, but the prosecution did not agree. According to the Magistrate Judge, defense counsel failed to explain to the court how this agreement was relevant to the case.
During the prosecutor's closing statement, the prosecutor made several improper remarks that misused evidence and misled the jury about the DNA evidence and the dropped rape charge. Defense counsel did not object to any of it. He also did not object to an improper jury charge.
After losing in state court, Gueits brought the winning habeas petition. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Gueits had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The judge made clear that the question for the court was not whether or not Gueits was guilty or innocent, but whether he had been deprived of his right to counsel, which he had. The judge added, though, that the question of guilt of innocence "is a matter that should nevertheless be of paramount importance to the State of New York."
One other thing to note in the Magistrate Judge's report is that, during the habeas proceedings, the State put forward a new theory of the case -- that the victim was never actually raped, and that the sex had been consensual, even though the victim repeatedly stated that she had been raped and the prosecutor at the trial had asked her about "the man who had raped her." I guess it is this dissonant shift in theories that would lead a Magistrate Judge to conclude that the prosecution was a bit "cynical."
The district court judge has now adopted the report and recommendation, which means that there now officially has been a habeas grant. Because habeas relief was granted, the State have a right to appeal the case to the Second Circuit. I am sure they will.
What to make of this case? The facts are highly unusual, so it is difficult to make broad sweeping judgments. But, for me, there are a couple of interesting things worth discussing.
First, it is interesting that not all of the errors that counsel made were of the slap your hand on your forehead and shout out, "What was he thinking?" variety. Some were, but others were a little more subtle. However, it really doesn't, or shouldn't, matter that some mistakes were subtle. The errors here, including the most subtle ones, caused a great deal of prejudice to Gueits. The only evidence that directly linked Gueits to the crime was evidence that should not have been admitted. And the evidence that was admitted to establish that fact was equivocal. And the prosecutor improperly made use of that equivocal evidence to establish a stronger link than really existed. It really is a case where there was a breakdown in the process.
At the same time, anybody reading this decision will be compelled to ask, just what in the world did happen here? The story that Gueits gave to the police seems unbelievable, he was in the park and did have her blood on his shoe. At the same time, DNA evidence exonerated him of the rape and the victim did say that the same person who raped her was the one who assaulted her. So, the evidence was contradictory making it really hard to sort out in one's mind a logical version of what actually could have happened.
The other big point here is the prosecution's conduct. The Magistrate Judge described it as "cynical." That is actually pretty generous in my mind. I am usually pretty open-minded to the belief that the prosecution doesn't act maliciously. At least, without an animus towards the particular defendant. Lawyers are competitive people, often times, with big egos. Prosecutors are lawyers. It's a basic syllogism. Also, it is difficult for most people to step outside of the situation that they are in, look at things from a different perspective, and reassess their position.
In a criminal case, these cascading forces can cause great ripple effects. A prosecutor becomes convinced that a defendant has committed the crime, regardless even of a change in circumstances. Rather than change opinions, prosecutors (like most people) will bunker down and fight even harder to show that their position is correct. The prosecutor, as a lawyer with likely a big ego, will approach the trial as a must-win proposition, not as a way for justice to be served. This happens in many of the wrongful conviction cases. Lawyers want to win and do what they can to ensure it. The prosecutor broke many evidentiary and trial rules to accomplish that here. It is usually not done with malice, just with a blind desire to win.
But unfortunately, the State's actions here cannot be written off as mere human failing. The State's cynicism and basic meanness really can be seen in the statements they made in the habeas proceeding. To say that this was not a rape, even though the victim repeatedly stated that and that was clearly their position at trial, is just shocking. It is also insulting to the victim, whose interest they no longer seem to be considering. That type of statement indicates that the State has lost its way in this case.
This is not to say that they won't be successful before the Second Circuit. We are still talking about habeasland, where habeas relief is granted less than 1% of the time. However, the injustice here was apparent, at least as set out in the Report and Recommendation, and it would truly serve the criminal justice system for Gueints to receive a fair trial with competent counsel where the jury is only allowed to consider admissible evidence, permissible arguments, and the exonerating DNA evidence. Only under those circumstances can anybody have faith that the verdict is reliable.
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