Sorry for taking so long to post this one, but I wanted to read through it again before talking about it, and then I never got around to it until now. It's a wacky one:
Pignataro
v.
Poole, 09-1396-pr, June 18, 2010, Winter, Hall, Cedarbaum, DJ, decision here
- Affirming Denial of Habeas
- Lower Court Info: 07-CV-431 (WDNY Mar. 27, 2009) (HBS) (unpublished)
- Issues: (1) that Appellant`s plea was involuntary because he was not
informed of a mandatory term of post release supervision ("PRS"); (2)
that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (3)
that his plea was involuntary, as he was under the influence of
psychotropic medication when pleading guilty. In addition to any other
arguments they may choose to raise in their briefs, the parties are
instructed to brief the following issues: (1) whether appellate
counsel`s failure to perfect the direct appeal provided cause for the
procedural default as to the first claim or for the failure to exhaust
the psychiatric medication claim; (2) whether Appellant suffered any
prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default, establish
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and excuse the failure to
exhaust the medication claim, even if the sentencing court did not
impose a PRS term, because the State may seek to resentence Appellant
pursuant to N.Y. Correctional Law 601-d and People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.
3d 457 (2008); and (3) whether Appellant`s 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion was
ripe in light of the fact that he is not currently serving a PRS term
ANALYSIS: This was a really strange opinion. The court concludes that, because post-release supervision ("PRS") was not a direct consequence of the guilty plea, the guilty plea was not involuntary where the court failed to mention during the guilty plea that petitioner would have to serve a PRS term.
On the merits, I think that is wrong. But the strange part is the court's analysis.
Petitioner pled guilty and at his guilty plea, there was no mention of PRS. Then, at sentencing, the PRS term was not orally imposed by the court. Petitioner argued that his guilty plea was not voluntary because the court did not tell him about the PRS at the guilty plea.
Preliminarily, petitioner did not raise the voluntariness issue in state court. In fact, his appellate counsel did not bring an appeal at all. So, the voluntariness issue was procedurally defaulted. Petitioner argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise it and that represented cause for the default.
The court says that ineffectiveness can represent cause. But petitioner also must show prejudice for the court to review the claim. And the court concludes that there was no prejudice.
Here's the first strange part. The court concludes that, to show prejudice, petitioner must show that, under federal law, the plea was involuntary. In one sense, that appears to be true. If the ineffectiveness claim can only be used to get over the procedural default, then, yeah, prejudice can only be shown if the underlying federal constitutional claim is meritorious. Okay.
But why can't the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim be its own independent claim? I don't see any reason why it can't. It was exhausted. And, as the court acknowledges, there was prejudice here since New York courts have concluded that PRS is a direct consequence of a guilty plea under the New York State constitution. So if it had been raised on direct appeal, petitioner would have won. This seems like constitutional ineffectiveness to me.
Maybe this was never raised as an independent claim. The COA suggests that it was. But this was a pro se litigant, so maybe something got lost in translation. I don't know. Seems like he should have won on that.
Here's the second strange part. The court finds that PRS was not a direct consequence of the guilty plea because, even though it was clearly mandatory and the court had to impose it, the Legislature later passed a law that allowed for PRS not to be imposed if the sentencing court failed to impose it at the original sentencing proceeding. If the absurdity of that isn't obvious on its face, then I am not sure if I can make it more clear.
Okay, one try: like petitioner's case, many, many courts screwed up this PRS stuff. There has been a lot of litigation over it and it has created a lot of havoc in the system. The Legislature decided to come up with a way to try and mitigate the damage. So the Legislature passed this law so that the guilty pleas that were entered without the court mentioning the PRS term could remain in place. The court says that because this law exists then PRS wasn't automatic. And it's true that, as a result of the law, some people didn't have to serve it. But these people didn't have to serve it only because the original sentencing judge screwed it up. Without the mistakes, the judges were still required to impose it and the defendant was still required to serve it. Everything being equal, it is still an automatic consequence of a guilty plea. It always will be. Strange, strange analysis.